Negligence: Duty of Care and Buick Motor Co.

Negligence, vocation and bump of Duty. To constitute a lawful natural process against some unmatchables heedlessness, several requirements to be fulfilled. scratch one is that there moldiness exist some affair of business organisation towards the complainant by the defendant. The second one is that the defendant should breach such duty of sustenance imposed on him. The third one is that the neglect done by the defendant should be the cause of the wound resulted to the plaintiff. The quaternate one is that the harm should have some monetary place. In Haynes V Harwood (1935) 1 KB 146 at 152, try Greer L.J, pointed out these requirements in his sound judgement stating that Negligence in the air will non do negligence, in order to give a cause of action, must be the break down of some duty owed to the person who makes the demand. The simple meaning is that if one done negligence actions, in a place, which is untouched by opposite state, in such a place, there wou ld non arise a duty of care toward others. Therefore the question of the breach of such duty of care would also not arise. In such a side a legal action on negligence can not be instituted.To understand above elements pertaining to negligence in law of civil wrong, we shall establish them in detail. Duty of Care Intort law, aduty of careis alegalobligationimposed on an somebody requiring that they adhere to a standardof liablecare while acting any acts that could foreseeably harm others. It is the first element that must be effected to proceed with an action innegligence. The claimant mustbe able to posea duty of care imposed by law which the defendant has breached.The duty of care may be imposedby subprogram of lawbetween individuals with nocurrentdirect relationship (familial or concentrateual or otherwise), scarce eventually become related in some manner. At common law, duties were formerly limited to those with whom one was inprivityone way or another, as exemplified b y cases likeWinterbottom v. Wright(1842). In the early 20th century, judges began to recognize that enforcing the privity requirement against hapless consumers had grating results in many harvest-festival obligationcases.The idea of a prevalent duty of care that runs to all who could be foreseeably affected by ones cope (accompanied by the demolishing of the privity barrier) first appeared in the landmark U. S. case ofMacPherson v. Buick move Co. (1916) and was imported into UK law by another landmark case,Donoghue v Stevenson1932. MacPherson v. Buick aim Co. , 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916) A famousNew York Court of Appeals thought by JudgeBenjamin N. Cardozowhich removed the requirement ofprivity of contractfor duty innegligenceactions Theplaintiff, Donald C.MacPherson, a stonecutter, was injured when one of the wooden wheels of his 1909 Buick Runabout collapsed. Thedefendant,Buick Motor Company, had construct the vehicle, but not the wheel, which had been manufactur ed by another party but installed by defendant. It was conceded that the defective wheel could have been discovered upon inspection. The defendant denied indebtedness because the plaintiff had purchased the automobile from a dealer, not straight off from the defendant. The portion of the MacPhersonopinion in which Cardozo demolished the privity bar to recovery is as follows If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and ramification in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the consequence to be expected. If to the element of danger there is added companionship that the thing will be utilise by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully. That is as far as we need to go for the decision of this case . . . . If he is negligent, where danger is to be oreseen, a liability wi ll follow Donoghue v. Stevenson1932 The case ofDonoghue v. Stevenson1932 illustrates the law of negligence, laying the foundations of thefault linguistic rule around the Commonwealth. The Plaintiff, Donoghue, drank ginger beer given to her by a acquaintance, who bought it from a shop. The beer was supplied by a manufacturer, Stevenson in Scotland. While drinking the drink, Donoghue discovered the remains of an allegedly decomposedslug. She then sued Stevenson, though there was no relationship of contract, as the friend had made the payment.As there was nocontract,the doctrine ofprivityprevented a direct action against the manufacturer. In his ruling, justice Lord MacMillan defined a new kin of delict (the Scots law nearest equivalent of tort), ( based on implied warrant of fitness of a product in a completely antithetical category of tortproducts liability) because it was analogous to previous cases about people hurting each other. Lord Atkin interpreted the biblical passages to love thy neighbour, as the legal requirement to not harm thy neighbour. He then went on to define neighbour as persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions that are called in question. Reasonably foreseeable harm must be compensated. This is the first principle of negligence. Breach of the Duty The test is both subjective and objective. The defendant who knowingly (subjective) exposes the plaintiff/claimant to a substantial stake of loss, breaches that duty.The defendant who fails to realize the substantial stake of loss to the plaintiff/claimant, which anyreasonable personobjective in the same situation would clearly have realized, also breaches that duty. Breach of duty is not limited to professionals or persons under written or oral contract all members of society have a duty to exercise reasonable care toward others and their property. A person who engages in activities that pose an unreasonable risk toward others and their property that actually results in harm, breaches their duty of reasonable care.An example is shown in the facts ofBolton v. Stone,5a 1951 legal case decided by theHouse of Lordswhich established that a defendant is not negligent if the damage to the plaintiff was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of his conduct. In the case, a deteriorate Stone was struck on the head by a play ball while standing outside her house. Cricket balls were not ordinarily hit a far enough distance to pose a danger to people standing as far away as was Miss Stone.Although she was injured, the court held that she did not have a legitimate claim because the danger was not sufficiently foreseeable. Causation For a defendant to be heldliable, it must be shown that the particular acts or omissions were the cause of the loss or damage sustained. Although the notion sounds simple, the causation between ones breach of duty and the harm that results to another can at times be very complicated. The fundamental test is to ask whether the injury would have occurred but for, or without, the criminate partys breach of the duty owed to the injured party.Even more precisely, if a breaching party materially increases the risk of harm to another, then the breaching party can be sued to the value of harm that he caused. Sometimes causation is one part of a multi-stage test for legal liability. For example for the defendant to be held liable for the tort of negligence, the defendant must have (1) owed the plaintiff aduty of care (2) breached that duty (3) by so doing causeddamageto the plaintiff and (4) that damage must not have been too remote. Causation is but one division of the tort.On other occasions causation is the only requirement for legal liability (other than the fact that the outcome is proscribed). For example in the law ofproduct liability, the fact that the defendants product caused the plaintiff harm is the only thing that matters. The defendant need not also have been negligent. On still other occasions, causation is distant to legal liability altogether. For example, under a contract ofindemnity insurance, theunderwriteragrees to indemnify thevictimfor harm not caused by the insurer, but by other parties.Where establishing causation is required to establish legal liability, it is usually tell that it involves a two-stage inquiry. The first stage involves establishing factual causation. Did the defendant act in the plaintiffs loss? This must be established in the lead inquiring into legal causation. The second stage involves establishing legal causation. This is often a question of public policy is this the sort of situation in which, patronage the outcome of the factual enquiry, we might nevertheless release the defendant from liability, or impose liability?